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Abstract—We study the membership inference (MI) attack
against classifiers, where the attacker’s goal is to determine
whether a data instance was used for training the classifier.
Through systematic cataloging of existing MI attacks and ex-
tensive experimental evaluations of them, we find that a model’s
vulnerability to MI attacks is tightly related to the generalization
gap—the difference between training accuracy and test accuracy.
We then propose a defense against MI attacks that aims to close
the gap by intentionally reduces the training accuracy. More
specifically, the training process attempts to match the training
and validation accuracies, by means of a new set regularizer using
the Maximum Mean Discrepancy between the softmax output
empirical distributions of the training and validation sets. Our
experimental results show that combining this approach with
another simple defense (mix-up training) significantly improves
state-of-the-art defense against MI attacks, with minimal impact
on testing accuracy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years we see widespread adoption of Machine
Learning (ML) techniques in real-world applications, such as
image and speech recognition, and user behavior prediction.
Increasingly, as companies and organizations integrate ML
components into their products and services, this ubiquitous
deployment also leads to increasing scrutiny on the security
and privacy implications of ML techniques.
The threat of membership inference (MI) attacks against
classifiers — where an attacker detects whether a specific
data instance was used as training data— has received much
attention in the literature [19], [21], [22], [25], [31]. An
attacker—who is given access to the target classifier— seeks to
determine whether an instance (x, y)—where x is the feature
vector and y is its label— is a member of the dataset used
to train it (the classifier). An MI attack is itself a binary
classification, and will have false positive and false negative
rates depending on the set of instances used in the evaluation.
A standard way used in the literature [19], [22], [25], [31]
to measure the effectiveness of an MI attack and compare
different attacks, is to measure its accuracy over a balanced set
that consists of half members (instances used in training) and
half non-members. Since a trivial attack of randomly guessing
whether an instance is a member has accuracy of 1/2, we
define the advantage of an attack to be its accuracy over a
balanced set minus 1/2.
Effective MI attacks pose a significant threat to the privacy
of the individuals whose records have been used in training
data. For example, cancer patient records may be used to train
a classifier to predict what kind of treatment would be most
promising for a future patient. However, if high-accuracy MI
attacks can be carried out against this classifier, access to the
classifier may enable adversaries to learn sensitive personal
information about patients whose data were used as training
data.
It is known that overfitted classifiers are more susceptible
to MI attacks [24], [25], [31]. Given a classifier, its general-
ization gap g is defined to be g = aR − aE , where aR is the
classifier’s accuracy on training data, and aE is the classifier’s
accuracy on a dataset drawn from the same distribution as the
training data, e.g., the testing data. A classifier that overfits has
a large generalization gap. Intuitively, the generalization gap
of a classifier is closely related to its MI attack vulnerability.
A baseline attack —first introduced by Yeom et al. [31]—
concludes that an input (x, y) is a member of the training data
if and only if the classifier yields the correct label y on x. The
accuracy of the baseline attack for a balanced evaluation set
is 12 ∗ aR + 12 ∗ (1 − aE) = 1+aR−aE2 = 1+g2 . Its advantage
is therefore g2 . Thus, as long as the generalization gap exists,
the baseline attack will have some level of effectiveness.
Contributions. In this paper, we study MI attacks and
defenses, and make the following contributions:
1) We systematically catalog existing MI attacks and per-
form extensive experimental evaluations of their effective-
ness. Surprisingly, we find that the simple baseline attack
provides an excellent estimate of a model’s vulnerability
to existing MI attacks. For many settings, the baseline
attack achieves an advantage that is close to the highest
advantage achieved by any existing MI attack. In all
settings (except for the MNIST dataset), the highest attack
advantage achieved in any attack is less than 1.5 times that
of the baseline attack. Models for the MNIST dataset are
minimally affected by MI attacks, with the highest attack
advantage being 2%, and the baseline advantage being
1%.
These results directly link the generalization gap with the
vulnerability against MI attacks. Any model is vulnerable
to the baseline attack, which has an advantage of g/2.
And no MI attack performs significantly better than
the baseline attack. Understanding this link will help
research on MI attacks. For example, some researchers
have proposed to defend against MI attacks by limiting
access to the prediction probability vector, e.g., restricting
the probability vector only to the top k classes, coarsen
the precision of the probability vector, or increase the
entropy by using temperature in softmax function. These
defenses are ineffective against the baseline attack. Any
proposed defenses that do not close the generalization gap
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cannot be effective, even if they are able to reduce the
advantage of certain attacks, as they remain vulnerable to
the baseline attack.
2) Our main contribution is a new, principled defense against
MI attacks. We propose to intentionally reduce training
accuracy to validation accuracy, while maintaining test
accuracy. We achieve this by adding a regularizer to the
training loss function. Our new regularizer computes the
distance between the empirical distribution of the softmax
output over the training set and that of a validation
dataset. It penalizes the situation where training instances
have significantly different output distributions from the
validation instances that are not directly used in training.
Our penalty uses the Maximum Mean Discrepancy
(MMD) [8], in the form of a non-parametric kernel
two-sample test as introduced by Greton et al. [10],
which gives us a measure of the difference between
the two empirical distributions. In practice, MMD alone
tends to reduce both the training and test accuracy, an
unwanted outcome. To tackle this challenge, we propose
to combine MMD with mix-up training [32], which, in
our experiments, garners the benefits of MMD without
the test accuracy penalty.
3) We empirically compare our proposed MMD+Mix-up
regularizer defense with other defenses such as Mem-
Guard [15] and DP-SGD. For DP-SGD, we vary the
amount of added noises and measure the resulting ac-
curacy numbers as well as highest attack advantage num-
bers. We show that our proposed MMD+Mix-up defense
achieves significant better accuracy — MI vulnerability
tradeoff than existing defenses.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II discusses adversary models and nomenclature of
attacks. Section III summarizes and evaluates all existing at-
tacks. Section IV describes existing defenses and our proposed
defenses. Section V presents the evaluation of our defense and
existing defenses. Related work is discussed in Section VI.
Section VII concludes this paper. An appendix gives additional
information.
II. ADVERSARY MODELS AND NOMENCLATURE
We consider ML models that are used as c-class classifiers.
Each instance is a pair (x, y), where x is the feature and y is
the label. A classifier typically uses a softmax function, and is
trained with cross-entropy loss function. For any input instance
x, the target classifier FT outputs FT (x), a length-c vector
of non-negative real values that are output of the softmax
function. The components of FT (x) sum up to 1 and are
generally interpreted as the confidence values that x belongs
to each of the c classes. The predicted class is the one with
the highest corresponding value in FT (x). In some cases, the
values in the vector FT (x) are calibrated so that they indeed
represent some probabilities; in other cases, these values sum
up to 1, but do not have real probability interpretation. For
convenience, we call FT (x) the probability vector.
The adversary’s goal is to determine whether an instance
x is a member of the dataset for training a target classifier
FT . We consider the following three classes of adversaries, in
increasing strengths.
• Label-only Oracle. The adversary has no knowledge (or,
equivalently, does not utilize any such knowledge) of the
training process or the data distribution, and is given only
the predicted label of the each instance.
Some proposed defense against MI attacks include limit-
ing the amount of information in the predicted probability
vector. This model is under the extreme situation where
the probability vector is completely removed. The only
attack that is feasible under this model is the baseline
attack, which predicts member when the target model
returns the correct label.
• Probability-Vector Oracle. The adversary is given black-
box/oracle access to the target classifier, which gives a
probability vector for each instance. This is perhaps the
most natural adversary model.
• Training-plus-Data. The adversary knows the training
process such as the classifier architecture, hyper param-
eters, and training algorithms, and the distribution of the
data used in training. In addition, the adversary has oracle
access to the target classifier FT , that is, the adversary
can query FT and obtain the probability vector.
Knowledge of the training process and data distribution
enables the adversary to train shadow classifiers that
behave similarly to the target classifier, and learn in-
formation about the target classifier through the shadow
classifiers. This adversary may not be realistic in all
settings; however, understand a model’s vulnerability to
MI attacks under this model provides an upper-bound.
In [22], other adversary models for MI attacks were con-
sidered. These include white-box attacks, in which the attacker
also knows the parameters of the target classifier, and federated
training settings, in which the attacker may also observe the
updates during the training. Similar to [4], [15], [19]–[21],
[24], we focus on the setting where the adversary uses oracle
accesses to the target classifier, although a Training-plus-Data
attacker has access to sufficient information to train shadow
classifiers similar to the target classifier. Threats from attacks
in the black-box settings are more serious, because it can
be carried out by anyone who can query a classifier, e.g.,
in the Machine Learning as a Service setting. Understanding
threats from MI attacks in the black-box setting also helps
understanding MI attacks in other settings.
III. EVALUATING EXISTING MI ATTACKS
In this section, we discuss existing membership inference
(MI) attacks, empirically evaluate their effectiveness, and com-
pare these with the generalization gap. These result help us
design defenses against MI attacks in Section IV.
A. Summary of MI Attacks
We now summarize black-box MI attacks that have been
proposed in the literature. We assign a two-part name to each
attack. The first part of a name is based on the granularity
of the MI attack. An attack may use one Global model or
threshold value for all instances, or use one model (or threshold
value) for each Class or each Instance. The second part of a
name is based on the features used in the attack.
The Class-Vector Attack [25]. To our knowledge, Shokri
et al. [25] presented the first study on MI attacks against
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Attacks Feature Method Adversary Model Computational Cost
Instance-Vector [19] Probability Vector FT (x) KL distance to avg Training plus Data High
Class-Vector [25] Probability Vector FT (x) Neural Network Training plus Data Medium
Global-Probability [31] Probability of correct label Threshold Training plus Data Medium
Global-Loss [31] Training Loss Loss(x, y) Threshold Training plus Data Medium
Global-TopThree [24] Top3 in FT (x) Neural Network Training plus Data Medium
Global-TopOne [24] Top1 in FT (x) Threshold Probability-Vector Oracle Low
Baseline [31] Predicted Class y′ Binary Label-only Oracle Very Low
TABLE I: Summary of different black-box MI attacks proposed in previous works and this work.
classifiers. The attack is in the “Training-plus-data” adversary
model, and uses the probability vector FT (x) as the feature
for determining whether x is a member.
The adversary knows a dataset DA, which is from the same
distribution as the dataset used to train the target classifier.
The adversary creates k samples D1, D2, . . . , Dk from DA,
and trains k shadow classifiers, one from each Di. Using data
generated by these shadow classifiers, the attacker trains c MI
classifiers, one for each class. The classifier for class y is
trained using instances in DA that are of class y. For each such
instance x, one can obtain k training instances, one from each
shadow classifier. Each MI classifier takes a probability vector
FT (x) as input, and produces a binary classification result.
When trying to determine the membership of an instance (x)y ,
one feeds FT (x) to the MI classifier for class y to obtain
a binary membership prediction. The computational cost of
this method includes training of multiple shadow models and
training of attack models.
The Baseline (Global-Label) Attack [31]. Yeom et al. [31]
analyzed the relationship between overfitting and membership,
and proposed two attacks, one of which predicts that an
instance x is a member for training FT if and only if FT (x)
gives the correct label on x. This attack can be applied to the
“Label-only Oracle” adversary model, in which the adversary
is given only the label.
The advantage of the Baseline attack can be estimated
from the training and testing accuracy. Let aR be the training
accuracy, and aE be the testing accuracy. Then g = aR−aE is
the generalization gap. Given a balanced evaluation set, the
accuracy of the baseline attack is the average of its accuracy
on members and non-members. By definition, its accuracy on
members is about aR and its accuracy on non-members is
about 1 − aE . Its overall accuracy is thus 12 ∗ aR + 12 ∗ (1 −
aE) =
1+aR−aE
2 =
1+g
2 . Its advantage is therefore
g
2 . This
estimation of accuracy is an approximation but our experiments
empirically show that this estimation is quite accurate. Since
this attack is so simple and broadly applicable, we call this
attack the baseline attack. This attack’s advantage provides
a lower-bound estimation of a classifier’s vulnerability to MI
attacks. The computational cost of this attack is minimal, since
to determine membership of an instance, this attack just needs
one query on the target classifier.
The Global-Loss Attack [31]. This attack uses the probability
vector FT (x) for an instance x with true label y to compute
the cross-entropy loss: Loss(x, y) = − log(FT (x)y), where
FT (x)y is the probability value for the true label y. The attack
predicts x to be a member when Loss(x, y) is smaller than the
average loss of all training instances. We consider this attack
to be in the Training-plus-Data adversary model, because the
average training loss is not normally provided. The natural way
to obtain it is to build one or more shadow classifiers. This
method also requires training one or more shadow models,
from which one can estimate the average loss of all training
instances in the target model.
The Global-Probability Attack. We note that the Global-
Loss attack effectively predicts an instance to a member if
the probability for the correct label is above some threshold.
It fixes the threshold based on the average value for all
training instances. This threshold may not achieve the maxi-
mum accuracy. We thus also consider using shadow classifiers
and training data to compute the threshold that achieves the
best accuracy. We call this the Global-probability attack. This
method needs to train shadow models and the best threshold
needs to be calculated.
The Global-TopOne Attack [24]. Instead of using the
probability of the correct label, Salem et al. [24] proposed to
use the highest value in the probability vector. They proposed
an interesting threshold-choosing approach that exploits oracle
access to the target classifier. One randomly generates some
data instances, which are non-members with high probability,
and query the target classifier with these instances. One then
chooses the threshold using the top t percentile among the Top
1 probabilities from the probability vectors of these instances.
Experiments on different t in range from 5% to 25% showed
decent performance. The computational cost of this method is
moderate since model training is not needed and the adversary
only needs to make some queries to select the threshold.
The Global-TopThree Attack [24]. Salem et al. [24]
proposed an attack to use only the top three values in the
probability vector for MI attack. This is in part motivated by
considering the “Probability-Vector Oracle” model, in which
the adversary cannot train shadow classifiers to generate train-
ing data for MI classifiers. Salem et al. [24] proposed a data
transferring attack, where the adversary trains one shadow clas-
sifier using a different dataset and different classifier structure.
Since the number of classes may be different for the shadow
classifier and the target classifier, the adversary chooses top
3 values in the probability vector (top 2 in case of binary
classification) as the features for MI attack. Furthermore, only
a single global MI classifier is used. The computational cost of
this method includes training of shadow model using different
dataset and training of attack models. The attack models can
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be logistic regression model or neural networks.
The Instance-Vector Attack [19]. Long et al. [19] proposed
three MI attacks, all in the “Training-plus-data” adversary
classifier. The first attack in [19] is called the untargeted attack,
which trains an MI classifier that takes a probability vector
FT (x) and the label y as the feature, and whether (x, y) is
used in training the classifier M as label. This is essentially
equivalent to the Class-Vector attack discussed above. The
Class-Vector attack trains c classifiers, one for each class. Even
though this attack trains just one classifier, the class label is
taken as an input into the classifier, enabling the classifier
to adapt based on the class label. Because it is essentially
equivalent to the Class-Vector attack, we do not consider it
separately in the rest of this paper.
The remaining two attacks in [19] train instance-specific
MI classifiers. That is, there is one MI classifier for
each instance x. To enable this, one creates k samples
D1, D2, · · · , Dk of DA, and trains 2k shadow classifiers,
where FSi is trained with Di, and F
′S
i is trained with Di∪{x}.
For each instance x, one has k probability vectors FSi (x),
where 1 ≤ i ≤ k, from classifiers trained without x, and k
probability vectors F ′Si (x), from classifiers trained with x. The
intuition is that if x is used in training FT , then the probability
vector FT (x) should be more similar to the latter k than to
the former k.
Long et al. [19] investigated two ways to measure this
similarity, and found that the more effective approach is to
use the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. This attack requires
training of shadow models and the number of shadow models
needed is significantly more since this attack is an instance
based attack. For each training instance, the number of training
points for attack model is the same as the number of shadow
models. Thus, large number of shadow models are preferred.
B. Experimental Setup
We experimentally evaluate the effectiveness of these ex-
isting attacks. Here we first describe the experimental setup.
Datasets. We use the following datasets, which are used in
existing work on MI attacks.
CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. These are benchmark datasets
for evaluating image classification algorithms and systems.
They contain 60,000 color images of size 32 × 32, divided
into 50,000 for training and 10,000 for testing. In CIFAR-100,
these images are divided into 100 classes, with 600 images for
each class. In CIFAR-10, these 100 classes are grouped into
10 more coarse-grained classes; there are thus 6000 images
for each class. These two datasets are widely used to evaluate
membership inference attack in [21], [22], [24], [25], [31].
PURCHASE-100. This dataset is based on the “acquire
valued shopper” challenge from Kaggle. This dataset includes
shopping records for several thousand individuals. We obtained
the processed and simplified version of this dataset from the
authors of [25]. Each data instance has 600 binary features.
This dataset is clustered into 100 classes and the task is
to predict the class for each customer. The dataset contains
197,324 data instances. This dataset is also widely used to
evaluate membership inference attack in [15], [21], [22], [24],
[25].
TEXAS-100. This dataset includes hospital discharge data.
The records in the dataset contain information about inpatient
stays in several health care facilities published by the Texas
Department of State Health Services. Data records have fea-
tures about the external causes of injury, the diagnosis, the
procedures the patient underwent, and generic information.
We obtained a processed version of the dataset from the
authors of [25]. This dataset contains 67,330 records and 6,170
binary features which represent the 100 most frequent medical
procedures. The records are clustered into 100 classes, each
representing a different type of patient. This dataset is used to
evaluate membership inference attack in [15], [21], [22], [25].
MNIST. This is a dataset of 70,000 handwritten digits. The
size of each image is 32 × 32. The images are cropped to 28
× 28 so that the digits are located at the center of the image.
There are 10 classes of different digits in this dataset. There
are 60000 training images and 10000 testing images in this
dataset. This dataset is used to evaluate membership inference
attack in [24], [25].
Target classifiers. We choose the state-of-the-art NN ar-
chitecture for these datasets, and use Pytorch [23], a widely
used deep learning framework in academia, to implement these
neural networks.
For CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, we use AlexNet [16],
VGG [26], 2 ResNet [12] architectures, and 1 DenseNet [14]
architectures. For PURCHASE-100 and TEXAS-100, we fol-
low the NN architecture described in [22]. For MNIST dataset,
we follow the NN architecture described in [25].
In the existing literature on MI attacks (e.g., [21], [25]),
target classifiers are trained with a subset of the training
instances. More specifically, 10, 000 instances are used for
CIFAR-10 dataset, CIFAR-100 dataset, TEXAS-100 dataset
and MNIST dataset, and 20, 000 are used for PURCHASE-
100, which contains about three times more data as the other
datasets. Part of the reason is that one needs instances not used
in training to build shadow models. Also, as the training set
size increases, a model’s vulnerability to MI attacks becomes
small. As our purpose is to compare the effectiveness of
different MI attacks and defenses, we use the same setting
in most experiments in this paper. We do study the effect of
varying the number of training instances in Section V-F.
The training recipe for all datasets and classifiers are
summarized in Table VI on Page 14 in the appendix. For
widely-used benchmark datasets, namely CIFAR-10, CIFAR-
100, and MNIST, the training and testing accuracy numbers
in Table VI are for the situation of using the whole training
set for training. As a result, these testing accuracy numbers
in Table VI are generally higher than those in membership
inference experiments where classifiers are trained using only
a subset of the instances. These numbers are similar to
the ones reported elsewhere, demonstrating that the training
was done correctly. PURCHASE-100 dataset and TEXAS-100
dataset are not widely used benchmark datasets, and we report
numbers when using 20, 000 and 10, 000 training instances,
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Fig. 1: Attack advantage of different attacks for 5 models each on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, and 1 model each for PURCHASE
and TEXAS. Each bar represents a different attack. The higher horizontal line represents the generalization gap g and the lower
horizontal line represents the expected baseline attack advantage (g/2).
dataset CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 TEXAS-100 PURCHASE-100 MNIST
Training accuracy 0.994 0.984 0.778 0.981 0.999
Testing accuracy 0.776 0.366 0.485 0.791 0.981
Generalization gap 0.218 0.618 0.293 0.190 0.018
Largest attack advantage 0.156 0.332 0.191 0.145 0.020
Baseline attack advantage 0.112 0.308 0.143 0.101 0.010
Class-Vector attack advantage 0.138 0.299 0.161 0.106 0.013
Global-Loss attack advantage 0.156 0.331 0.191 0.143 0.013
Global-Probability attack advantage 0.147 0.332 0.177 0.145 0.013
Global-TopOne attack advantage 0.113 0.231 0.067 0.116 0.011
Global-TopThree attack advantage 0.131 0.251 0.121 0.125 0.012
Instance-Vector attack advantage 0.111 0.211 0.177 0.133 0.020
TABLE II: Training/testing accuracy and attack advantage for different datasets. For CIFAR-10 dataset and CIFAR-100 dataset,
we average throughout all the tested classifiers.
respectively.
Using Shadow Models. Several MI attacks need to utilize
“shadow classifiers” to train the attack classifiers. We train
50 shadow classifiers as our default choice and we follow
the workflow proposed in [25] with minor differences in
generating the training sets for shadow classifiers and target
classifiers, in order to achieve better efficiency for instance
level attacks (the Instance-Vector attack). The target models
and the shadow models are built in the exactly same way.
We want the evaluation setting to reflect the assumptions
that the adversary knows the general data distribution used in
training, but not the exact training set. More specifically, we
randomly divide D into three disjoint parts: DE , DG and DH .
DE is the evaluation set and has 5000 instances. MI attacks are
evaluated on accuracy of determining membership of instances
in DE . The target classifier is trained with a randomly sampled
set consisting of half of the instances in DE and the rest
sampled from DG. Each shadow classifier is trained with a
randomly sampled half of the instances in DE and the rest
sampled from DH . This way, each shadow classifier is trained
with half of the evaluation set, like the target classifier. At the
same time, at least 3/4 of the instances used for training the
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target classifier are never used in training any shadow classifier.
C. Results for Existing Attacks
An MI attack is itself a binary classification, and metrics
such as false positive and false negative rates, F1, etc., will
depend on the distribution of what percentage of the evaluation
set consist of members. Since there is no natural evaluation
distribution, the approach taken in the literature [19], [22],
[25], [31] on MI attacks is to measure its accuracy over a
balanced set that consists of half members and half non-
members. This measures an adversary’s MI attack accuracy
with a priori that the attacker does not favor a guess of member
or non-member. Since a trivial attack of randomly guessing
whether an instance is a member has accuracy of 1/2, we
define the advantage of an attack to be its accuracy over a
balanced set minus 1/2.
Figure 1 shows the attack advantage of each attack on
different classifier and dataset combinations. Table II provides
an average summary for all the attacks, including average
training and testing accuracy.
From Table II, we can see that on MNIST the generaliza-
tion gap is very small (around 0.02), and the highest attack
advantage among all attacks is also around 0.02. Essentially
models on MNIST are almost immune to existing MI attacks,
because it has a low generation gap. We thus do not include
MNIST dataset in Figure 1 or the following discussion of
different attacks.
The Baseline attack. From Figure 1, we see that the empir-
ically observed baseline attack advantage is very close to the
theoretical prediction of half of the generalization gap. We also
observe that, comparing with other attacks, the baseline attack
is pretty strong, even though it is trivial to implement and
requires minimal access to the target classifier. For example,
on CIFAR-100 and TEXAS-100, the two datasets that are more
vulnerable to MI attacks, the baseline attack can achieve 92.8%
and 74.9% of the highest attack advantage, respectively.
Comparing existing attacks. From Figure 1 and Table II,
we can observe that the Global-Loss attack and the Global-
Probability attack can provide the highest attack advantage.
The Class-Vector attack performs slightly worse than the
highest two attacks. The Global-TopOne attack and the Global-
TopThree attack performs strictly worse than the Class-Vector
attack and the Instance-Vector attack gives the lowest at-
tack advantage among all existing attacks. Specifically, the
Instance-Vector attack sometimes performs even worse than
the baseline attack.
Based on the feature each existing attack uses, we can
draw a conclusion that the probability of the correct label,
which is used by the Global-Loss attack and the Global-
Probability attack, is the most effective feature to launch MI
attacks. Even though the Class-Vector attack can utilize the
full prediction vector, it turns out that extra information does
not help to improve the attack advantage. If we compare the
Global-Probability attack with the Global-TopOne attack, we
can see that the Global-TopOne attack performs strictly worse
than the Global-Probability attack. In addition, the differences
in terms of advantage between these two attacks are highly
correlated with training accuracy. The following table shows
this relationship, the difference row is the difference between
the advantage of the Global-Probability attack and the Global-
TopOne attack.
MNIST Purchase CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 Texas
Training 0.999 0.993 0.994 0.984 0.778
Difference 0.002 0.029 0.034 0.101 0.110
This is because when training accuracy is low, the top-
one probability for training many instances are not that of the
correct label. This shows that the probability of the correct
label is better than the highest probability, in terms of attack
advantage that can be achieved.
As for the Instance-Vector attack, since this attack is an
instance-level attack, this attack requires significantly more
shadow models than other existing attacks, meaning that the
computational overhead is huge. In terms of attack advantage,
this attack performs strictly worse than the Class-Vector attack,
even though the input feature is the same, i.e. the full prediction
vector. On CIFAR-100 dataset, this attack performs even worse
than the Baseline attack. One possible reason is the choice of
using the full prediction vector. Based on previous observation,
if this attack uses only the probability of the correct label, it
might achieve higher attack advantage. Other possible reasons
are the choice of KL-divergence metric and the number of
shadow models.
In summary, we observe that simply using the probability
of the correct label can achieve the highest attack advantage.
In terms of constructing new defense, one should aim to ensure
that the distributions of the probability of the correct label for
members and non-members are as similar as possible, which
should also have the side-effect of reducing the generalization
gap. In this way, the attacks which rely on the probability of
the correct label can be defended.
IV. EXISTING DEFENSES AND OUR PROPOSED DEFENSES
A. Existing Defenses
Multiple defense mechanisms have been proposed in ex-
isting literature to mitigate the threat of membership inference
attack. We summarize existing defenses in the following.
Reducing generalization gap by increasing test accuracy.
In [25], Shokri et al. showed that using L2-Regularizer, which
reduces overfitting, can help defend against MI attacks. Salem
et al. [24] explored using Dropout, which was first proposed in
[27] to reduce overfitting, as a defense against MI attacks. As
these approaches improve testing accuracy and thus reduces
generalization gap, they indeed reduce vulnerability to MI
attacks. However, in many cases, these approaches are already
deployed, and the generalization gap (and hence vulnerability
to MI attacks) remain significant. Additional defense is needed
for these cases.
Hiding prediction information. In [25], it was proposed
to reduce the information given by the prediction vectors,
such as providing only the top-k probabilities and using high
temperature in softmax. This has limited effectiveness as the
top-k probabilities give enough information needed by the best
attacks, and high temperatures change only the absolute values
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of confidences, but not the fact that confidences for members
tend to be higher than that for non-members.
Model Stacking and Adversary-Specific Defense. Salem et
al. [24] also proposed to use model stacking as a defense.
Model stacking is a common ensemble technique used in
machine learning applications, which combines multiple weak
classifiers together to make the final prediction.
Nasr et al. [21] proposed a Min-Max Game style defense
to train a secure target classifier. During the training of
the target classifier, a defender’s attack classifier is trained
simultaneously to launch the membership inference attack. The
optimization objective of the target classifier is to reduce the
prediction loss while minimizing the membership inference
attack accuracy. This is equivalent to adding a new regulariza-
tion term to the training process, which is called adversarial
regularization.
Jia et al. [15] proposed the Mem-Guard defense. In this
defense, one trains an MI attack model in addition to the target
classifier. When the target classifier is queried with an instance,
the resulting prediction vector is not directly returned. Instead,
one tries to find a perturbed version of the vector such that the
perturbation is minimal, the prediction label is not changed,
and the MI attack model output (0.5,0.5) as its prediction
vector. This perturbed vector is then returned.
In [15], it is shown that Mem-Guard is more effective than
Min-Max Game and Model Stacking. We compare with Mem-
Guard in Section V-C.
Differential Privacy. Differential privacy [5]–[7] is a widely
used privacy-preserving technique. A differential privacy based
defense techniques adds noise to the training process of a
classifier. One example is DP-SGD proposed in [1]. Noise
is added to the gradient to ensure the data privacy. Training
with differential privacy provide theoretical guarantee against
any MI attacks.
Currently, achieving a meaningful theoretical guarantee
(e.g., with a resulting  < 5) requires the usage of very large
noises. However, one could use much smaller noises in DP-
SGD. While doing this fails to provide a meaningful theoretical
guarantee (the  value would be too large), adding noises in
the training process can nonetheless provide empirical defense
against MI attacks. In this paper, we conduct an empirical
comparison with DP-SGD to see which defenses achieve a
better tradeoff between testing accuracy and resiliency against
MI attacks.
B. Our proposed defenses
Our experimental results show that the generalization gap is
directly related to vulnerability to MI attacks. Thus the first line
of defense against MI attacks is to reduce overfitting, which
is also one of the primary goals of ML research itself. Our
experimental results also show that the feature that enables the
most effective MI attacks is the confidence level of the true
label for an instance. We call this the label confidence of an
instance. MI attacks exploit the fact that members in general
have higher label confidence values than non-members do.
Thus a promising idea for defence is to make the distribution
of label confidence for members to be close to that of non-
members. We propose a defense that combines the above two
ideas.
Mix-up Training Augmentation. The first piece of our
proposed defense is mix-up training, which was first introduced
by Zhang et al. [32]. Mix-up training uses linear interpolation
of two different training instances to generate a mixed instance
and train the classifier with the mixed instance. The generation
of mixed instances can be described as follows:
x˜ = λxi + (1− λ)xj ,
y˜ = λyi + (1− λ)yj , (1)
where λ ∼ beta(α, α), α ∈ (0,∞). Here xi and xj in
equation 1 are instance feature vectors randomly drawn from
the training set; yi and yj are one-hot label encodings corre-
sponding to xi and xj . (x˜, y˜) is used in training. In Zhang
et al. [32] it is shown that mix-up training can improve
generalization, resulting in higher accuracy on CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100. This, in turn, reduces the generalization gap. Also,
intuitively, since only the mixed instances are used in training,
the classifier will not be directly trained in the original training
instances, and should not remember them as well.
MMD-based Regularization. The second piece of our
proposed defense aims at making the distribution of label
confidence for members to be close to that of non-members.
This is achieved by adding to the training loss function a
regularizing term that is based on the difference between the
probability vector distribution of the minibatch in training, and
and that from a validation set.
We need a differentiable metric to measure the difference,
and choose to use Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) [8],
[10]. MMD is used to construct statistical tests to deter-
mine if two samples are drawn from different distributions,
based on Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space (RKHS) [3]. Let
X = (x1, · · · , xn) and Y = (y1, · · · , ym) be the random
variable sets drawn from distribution P and Q. The empirical
estimation of distance between P and Q, as defined by MMD,
is:
Distance(X,Y ) =
∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
φ(xi)− 1
m
m∑
j=1
φ(yj)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
H
, (2)
where H is a universal RKHS, and φ : X 7→ H is a function
mapping each sample to a point in H. In MMD, φ should
be chosen to be the function that maximizes the resulting
norm, and is usually modeled using a neural network with
the parameters trained [18]. In our context, each xi (yi) is the
softmax output of the i-th training (validation) instance. To
reduce training time, we use a more traditional approach and
make φ the Gaussian kernel [10]. The sums
∑n
i=1 φ(xi) and∑m
j=1 φ(yj) are empirical estimates of the mean embeddings
of the training and validation softmax distributions [10] and,
thus, Equation (2) is a valid two-sample test. We adopt the
implementation from [29]. We leave the task of performing
a stronger two-sample test with a minimax-optimized MMD
objective as future work. Note that the regularizer Distance in
Equation (2) is invariant to permutations of the ordering of
the training (x1, . . . , xn) and validation (y1, . . . , yn) softmax
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Fig. 2: Attack advantage of different attacks for different classifiers on different datasets. Each bar represents a different attack
with our MMD & mix-up defense applied. The higher horizontal line represents the generalization gap and the lower horizontal
line represents the expected baseline attack advantage.
Dataset-Model Testing Accuracy Highest Attack Advantage Generalization Gap
- w/o def. w/ def. w/o def. w/ def. drop w/o def. w/ def. drop
CIFAR-10 - Alexnet 0.652 0.682 0.210 0.132 37.1% 0.337 0.142 57.9%
CIFAR-10 - VGG-16 0.811 0.809 0.162 0.097 40.1% 0.169 0.108 36.1%
CIFAR-10 - ResNet-20 0.820 0.818 0.130 0.086 33.8% 0.171 0.106 38.1%
CIFAR-10 - ResNet-110 0.794 0.784 0.150 0.077 48.7% 0.201 0.110 45.3%
CIFAR-10 - DenseNet-BC(100,12) 0.801 0.802 0.137 0.047 65.7% 0.196 0.077 60.7%
CIFAR-100 - Alexnet 0.248 0.238 0.284 0.071 75.0% 0.751 0.121 83.9%
CIFAR-100 - VGG-16 0.285 0.275 0.411 0.300 27.0% 0.715 0.542 24.2%
CIFAR-100 - ResNet-20 0.446 0.466 0.295 0.073 75.3% 0.542 0.127 76.6%
CIFAR-100 - ResNet-110 0.424 0.426 0.342 0.145 57.6% 0.574 0.243 57.7%
CIFAR-100 - DenseNet-BC(100,12) 0.428 0.430 0.256 0.074 71.1% 0.511 0.121 76.3%
Purchase - Purchase 0.791 0.781 0.142 0.089 37.3% 0.191 0.152 20.4%
Texas - Texas 0.485 0.481 0.191 0.151 20.9% 0.292 0.241 17.5%
TABLE III: Evaluation of different attacks on different dataset and models with or without our proposed defense.
outputs of the data instances, hence, Distance is a permutation-
invariant function (a set function).
In order to calculate the MMD regularization loss, we
need one mini-batch of training and validation instances. In
the implementation of our MMD loss, we choose to reduce
the difference between the probability vector distributions of
members and non-members for the same class. That is, a batch
of training samples and a batch of validation samples in the
same class are used together to compute the MMD score. Since
MMD is differentiable, we obtain two sets of gradients: the
first set is calculated based on training instances; the second
set is based on validation instances. To update our classifier,
we only use the first set of gradients, since the the second set of
gradients would optimize over the validation instances, which
is undesirable as it could overfit them and make the empirical
distribution (y1, . . . , ym) significantly different from that of
the (future) test data.
In the experiments, we ensure that the validation set is
disjoint from the training set of any target or shadow models
and the evaluation set for MI attacks. The size of training set
and the validation set is the same.
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Since technically the validation set is part of the input for
the training process, one natural question is whether instances
in the validation set would also be vulnerable to MI attacks.
However, since we discard the set of gradient with respect
to the validation set in training, the model is not directly
optimized to fit the distribution of validation set. Thus it
is expected that the MI attacks against validation set is not
effective. This is verified in experiments that will be reported
in section V-E.
V. EVALUATION OF PROPOSED DEFENSE
We have already described the detailed experimental set-
tings in Section III-B, and summarized the evaluation results
of the MI attacks in Section III-C. Here we evaluate the
effectiveness of our proposed defences.
A. Results for defenses
When using the MMD defense, one can choose the weight
of MMD loss relative to training loss, and result in different
privacy-accuracy trade-off. For the experiments in this subsec-
tion, we choose the weight to ensure that the generalization gap
can be reduced mostly while the testing accuracy drop is less
than 1%, compared to the classifiers trained without defense.
The details of the chosen MMD loss weight parameters can
be found in Table VI. In Section V-B, we show the results of
varying the weight and compare that to other defenses.
The results of applying our proposed defense are shown
in Figure 2 and Table III. We present the attack advantage of
different attacks on different model and dataset combinations
with our MMD & mix-up defense applied in Figure 2 and
Table III is to summarize Figure 2. For PURCHASE-100 and
TEXAS-100 dataset, we observed that using mix-up training
leads to training failure. Perhaps this is due to the fact that
the data features are binary. We thus do not evaluate mix-up
defense on them. The only applicable defense is the MMD loss
defense. More detailed ablation study of our proposed defense
is presented in Figure 7, Table VII and Table VIII in Section
VIII.
Our defense can significantly reduce the effectiveness
of existing attacks while keeping the testing accuracy. In
Table III, we can observe that, when our defense is applied,
the testing accuracy drop is less than 1% and the highest attack
advantage is significantly reduced. For CIFAR-10 dataset,
the average highest attack advantage is reduced from 0.158
to 0.088 (44.3% drop). For CIFAR-100 dataset, the average
highest attack advantage drop is reduced from 0.318 to 0.133
(58.2% drop). For Purchase and Texas dataset, with only the
MMD-Loss defense, the highest attack advantage drops 37.3%
and 20.9%, respectively.
The generalization gap is effectively reduced. From
Table III we can see that the generalization gap is significantly
reduced for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 dataset. For CIFAR-
10 dataset, the average generalization gap is reduced from
0.215 to 0.108 (almost 50% drop). For CIFAR-100 dataset,
the average generalization gap is reduced from 0.619 to 0.231
(62.7% drop). For Purchase and Texas dataset, with only the
MMD-Loss defense, the generalization gap drops 20.4% and
17.5%, respectively.
B. Comparing with existing defense
In modern deep neural network training, L2-regularizer and
dropout are widely used. In our experiment, we already use
these two techniques during the training, thus we don’t com-
pare our defense with these two. Model stacking, according
to [15], will incur high label loss, which implies high testing
accuracy drop. Also according to [15], the Mem-Guard defense
could outperform all existing defenses including MIN-MAX
Game defense [21]. In [15], Mem-Guard is also compared
with DP-SGD. However, it uses high noises that led to a
theoretical  of less than 1, which at the same time results in
low accuracy. Since we are comparing empirical performance,
a fairer comparison is to vary the noise levels and evaluate the
resulting tradeoff of accuracy and vulnerability to MI attacks.
Thus in this paper, we focus on comparing our proposed
defense with the state-of-the-art empirical defense Mem-Guard
and DP-SGD.
Figure 3 shows the results from comparing DP-SGD, mix-
up only, MMD loss only, MMD+mix-up defense and Mem-
guard defense together, using AlexNet on CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100. (A similar figure using VGG-16 is in Appendix.)
DP-SGD, MMD+Mixup, and MMD-only have tunable param-
eters and are plotted as curves. The other methods do not
have tunable parameters and show up as a single point in the
graph. In Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(c), we plot testing accuracy
against training accuracy. In Figure 3(b) and Figure 3(d),
we plot accuracy against highest attack advantage. In all
figures, bottom-right means high testing accuracy and low
generalization gap/attack advantage, and is thus preferred.
MMD+Mixup defense gives the best trade-off. In terms
of training-testing accuracy trade-off, our MMD+mix-up de-
fense can provide the lowest training accuracy given the same
testing accuracy. In terms of testing-accuracy-attack-advantage
trade-off, our MMD+mix-up defense can still provide the
lowest attack advantage given the same testing accuracy.
C. More detailed comparison with Mem-Guard
We now show results comparing MMD+Mixup with Mem-
Guard on specific attacks. More specifically, we use Baseline
attack, Global-Probability attack, Global-Loss attack, Global-
TopOne attack, Global-TopThree attack and Class-Vector at-
tack against Mem-Guard. We exclude the instance level attack
here because training a model with Mem-Guard is slow, and
we need to train 50 shadow classifiers to learn instance-specific
information. Even for a small CNN like Alexnet, it takes 14
hours to train one Alexnet classifier on CIFAR-10 with Mem-
Guard. For comparison, it takes around 2 hours to train one
Alexnet classifier with our MMD+Mix-up defense. Because of
training time, when comparing with Mem-Guard, we use only
AlexNet, VGG-16 and ResNet-20 on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-
100 dataset. We chose these three architecture because they
are smaller, and faster to train with Mem-Guard.
The results (averaged over AlexNet, VGG-16 and ResNet-
20) are shown in Table IV. We see that Mem-Guard defense
can fully defend Global-TopOne attack and Global-TopThree
attack. However, when it comes to Global-Probability attack
and Class-Vector attack, Mem-Guard defense can only reduce
the attack advantages of these two attack to the attack ad-
vantage of baseline attack. Mem-Guard has no impact on the
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Fig. 3: Comparison of different defense techniques on AlexNet, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 dataset.
baseline attack, since it does not reduce the generalization gap.
Our defense, which significantly reduces the generalization
gap, provides better defense since the largest attack advantage
under our defense is lower than the largest attack advantage
under Mem-Guard defense by a noticeable margin (0.046 for
CIFAR-10 and 0.191 for CIFAR-100).
D. The effect of our defense on prediction distributions
To illustrate why the MMD+Mixup defense could work,
we show the effect of our defenses on distributions of the
probability of correct labels for members and non-members in
Figure 4. The neural network used here is ResNet-20 and the
datasets is CIFAR-100. As shown in Figure 4 (a), when no
defense is deployed, the two distributions are highly different
from each other. The probability of correct label for members
are mostly centered near 1. However, for non-members, a
noticeable fraction of this group are clustered near 0, which
means the predictions for this fraction are wrong. When mix-
up defense is added, the two distributions become similar
but the difference is still observable. After adding MMD loss
defense, we see that the two distributions become almost the
same. The changes on distributions explain why our defenses
work. However, one still needs to notice that the generalization
gap is not fully eliminated and the generalization gap is still
larger than 0.1 when all defenses are deployed. This means
the attacker can still gain some attack advantage on the target
model.
E. Membership inference attack on validation set
We run the MI attacks on validation set to verify whether
the model is overfitted to the validation set. The attack models
are trained using the same way as Section V-A. The only
change is that the evaluation set is replaced by the validation
set. We compare the percentage of instances that are detected
to be used in training among training set, testing set and
validation set. We run the experiment using Alexnet on CIFAR-
10 and CIFAR-100 dataset, with our MMD+mixup defense
deployed.
As shown in Table V, the numbers for validation set and
testing set are almost the same, but very different from the
numbers for training set. This implies that the model is not
overfitted to the validation set.
F. Varying size of training set
Intuitively, a classifier’s vulnerability to MI attacks is
related to the size of the training set. Here we explore the
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Dataset CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
Defense level No Def. Mixup+MMD Mem-Guard No Def. Mixup+MMD Mem-Guard
Training accuracy 0.994 0.881 0.997 0.995 0.580 0.979
Testing accuracy 0.761 0.765 0.762 0.326 0.329 0.330
Generalization gap 0.232 0.116 0.235 0.669 0.251 0.649
Largest attack advantage 0.166 0.067 0.113 0.356 0.131 0.322
Baseline attack advantage 0.116 0.067 0.112 0.333 0.129 0.322
Global-Probability attack advantage 0.156 0.067 0.112 0.356 0.126 0.320
Global-Loss attack advantage 0.166 0.056 0.113 0.356 0.131 0.319
Global-TopOne attack advantage 0.120 0.049 0.028 0.249 0.076 0.009
Global-TopThree attack advantage 0.140 0.052 0.027 0.273 0.076 0.006
Class-Vector attack advantage 0.137 0.054 0.113 0.320 0.097 0.316
TABLE IV: Our MMD+Mix-up MI defense significantly outperforms the Mem-Guard defense [15] on the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-
100 dataset using Alexnet, VGG-16 and ResNet-20 CNNs. The numbers are averaged across the three neural networks.
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Fig. 4: The distribution of the probability of correct label for members and non-members with different levels of defenses.
ResNet-20, CIFAR-100.
Dataset CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
Data Source Train Valid. Test Train Valid. Test
Baseline attack 0.83 0.68 0.68 0.35 0.23 0.23
Global-Probability attack 0.62 0.46 0.48 0.37 0.29 0.29
Global-Loss attack 0.87 0.71 0.72 0.70 0.58 0.56
Global-TopOne attack 0.57 0.48 0.48 0.36 0.35 0.35
Global-TopThree attack 0.57 0.47 0.47 0.37 0.34 0.34
Class-Vector attack 0.63 0.54 0.54 0.48 0.47 0.46
TABLE V: Results of running MI attacks on training set, validation set and testing set. The numbers represent the fraction of
instances in each set that are detected to be members by different attacks.
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Fig. 5: Attack advantage vs size of training set. ResNet-20 on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 dataset, with and without MMD+Mix-up
defense.
effect of different size of training set by using three different
sizes: {10000, 20000, 30000} on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100
datasets, with ResNet-20. The two plots in the first row of
Figure 5 shows the results. We have three sets of attack
advantage bars for all three different training set sizes. We see
that the attack advantage values drop when the size of training
set is increasing. However, the drop is relatively small. When
the size of training set is increased from 10000 to 30000, the
maximum attack advantage drops from from 0.130 to 0.084
and 0.317 to 0.194 on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 dataset,
respectively. The two plots in the second row in Figure 5 shows
the effect of different number of training instances under the
defenses. We can see that the attack advantage drops gradually
when more training instances are used; however, the reduction
effect is less than deploying the defenses. One needs to notice
that adding more training instances can be combined with
deploying defenses.
G. Bound between Generalization Gap and the Highest attack
advantage.
Based our extensive evaluation of existing attacks on
different datasets and models, we notice that the baseline
attack could achieve decent attack advantage comparing to
the best one of existing attacks, before and after defense.
Meanwhile, we also observe an interesting phenomenon: the
generalization gap g is an empirically upperbound for the best
attack advantage, as shown in Figure 6. On the scatter plot,
each point represents one classifier on one dataset. The x axis
gives the generalization gap g, and the y axis gives the best
attack advantage v. We empirically observe that
g
2
≤ v ≤ g (3)
We leave additional analysis and validation of this phe-
nomenon for future work.
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Fig. 6: Generalization Gap vs Highest Attack Advantage. Each
point represents one classifier on one dataset.
VI. RELATED WORK
Membership inference from summary statistics were stud-
ied in the context of Genome-Wide Association Studies
(GWAS). Homer et al. [13] proposed attacks that could tell
with high confidence whether an individual participated in a
GWAS study, assuming that the individual’s DNA is known.
The attack works even if the group includes hundreds of
individuals. Because of the privacy concerns from such attacks,
a number of institutions, including the US National Institute of
Health (NIH) and the Welcome Trust in London all decided to
restrict access to data from GWAS. Wang et al [30] improved
these attack techniques.
Li et al. [17] introduced the membership privacy frame-
work, which prevents an adversary from significantly improv-
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ing its confidence that an entity is not in the dataset or not, and
showed that -differential privacy is equivalent to membership
privacy where the adversary’s prior belief is such that the
probability of any instance’s membership is independent from
that of any other instance. This framework was used in Backes
et al. [2] to address privacy concerns with genomics data.
Shokri et al. [25] presented the first study of MI attack on
classification models. The Class-Vector attack evaluated in this
paper is from [25]. Shokri et al. [25] observed that overfitting
is highly related to MI attacks, and regularization techniques
such as dropout and L2 regularization may be applied to
mitigate MI attacks. It is shown in Shokri et al. [25] that strong
L2 regularization leads to rapid drop of test accuracy. The
classifier models considered in this paper are already trained
using dropout.
Yeom et al. [31] quantitatively analyzed the relationship
between the MI attacks and the loss over both training set
and testing set. The Global-Loss attack and the baseline attack
are from this paper. Salem et al. [24] studied effect of MI
attacks using less and less information. They reported that
only one shadow model would be sufficient to launch the
attack proposed in Shokri et al. [25]. The Global-TopOne and
Global-TopThree attacks are from this paper. These attacks
are evaluated in our paper. See Section III for details on
these attacks. For defense, Salem et al. [24] proposed using
Dropout and model stacking as defense against MI attacks.
Since model stacking also reduces the generalization gap, it
can also mitigate the threat of MI attacks.
Long et al. [19] proposed the Instance-Vector attack. Long
et al. [20] first assess which instances are more vulnerable to
MI attacks, and then carry out attacks against those vulnerable
ones. Similar attacks can be carried out by analyzing the
distribution of an instance’s predicted probability in shadow
models, and are interesting future work.
Nasr et al. [21] proposed a privacy MIN-MAX game
to help defense the MI attack. The main idea comes from
GAN [9]. By replacing the discriminator with an attacker, the
benign users can train the target model and the attack model
simultaneously. The expected result is that a target model that
can resist the attack used in the training. From the numbers
reported in [21], one can see that while models trained in
this way can resist against MI attacks in Nasr et al. [21],
the generalization gap is such that the baseline attack would
have higher advantage. Nasr et al. [22] introduced white-
box MI attacks which leveraged the gradient information.
Their experiments showed that attacks exploiting the gradient
corresponding to the last layer can achieve higher advantage
than the the generalization gap. Investigating white-box attacks
is interesting future work.
Truex [28] studied MI attacks on traditional machine
learning algorithms such as logistic regression and K-nearest
neighbors. Their paper showed that logistic regression, K-
nearest neighbors, decision tree and Naive Bayes can be
easily attacked by the membership attack. Carlini et al. [4]
investigated membership inference attacks on text data and
showed that the deep language models can unintentionally
memorize training data, which is vulnerable to membership
inference attack. Hayes et al. [11] showed that GAN is also
vulnerable to membership attack. They utilized the output of
the discriminator of the GAN to determine the membership.
We point out that the baseline attack and attacks based on the
predicted probability of the correct label can be carried out in
these settings as well.
Jia et al. [15] brought adversarial example generation
into defending membership inference attack. In their defense,
which is called “Mem-Guard”, the defender trains its own
membership inference attack model and by generating adver-
sarial example based on each instance to fool the defender’s
attack model, the defender can use the “adversarial perturba-
tion” as the “noise”. After adding the “noise” to the prediction
vector of each instance, the noise will help to fool the attacker’s
attack model.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have conducted extensive experiments on
evaluating existing attack. We found that the baseline attack is
relatively strong and the most effective feature for doing MI
attacks is the probability of the correct label. By exploiting
these findings, we propose a new MI defense that intentionally
reduces the training accuracy as a way to defend against MI
attacks. In particular, our defense is based on a new regularizer
(MMD+Mix-up) that combines MMD loss with mix-up train-
ing to match the softmax output of the training and validation
distributions, thus reducing the effectiveness of MI attacks—
though not yet eliminating them. Our experiments show that
our MMD+Mix-up defense does not hurt the classifier’s test
accuracy.
A few open questions remain. For instance, whether the
generalization gap can be closed completely without reducing
the test accuracy. Another intriguing question is whether
there is an explanation for the empirical observation that the
generation gap seems to upper bound black-box MI attack
advantages. A future research direction is the extension of our
methods to white-box attacks.
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VIII. APPENDIX
A. Training recipe and model performance
We report the training accuracy and testing accuracy for
each model when training from scratch. The training set size
is 50000,50000,10000,20000 and 60000 for CIFAR-10 dataset,
CIFAR-100 dataset, TEXAS dataset, PURCHASE dataset and
MNIST dataset. See Table VI for more details.
B. Ablation study on our proposed defense
In Figure 7, we compare the attack advantage of baseline
attack, the highest attack advantage of existing attacks and
the generalization gap under different defenses. One main
observation is that using MMD loss or mix-up alone each
offers some reduction in generalization gap; and combining
mix-up with MMD loss offers better defense. However, the
generalization gap are not fully closed by the defense. We
summarize the numbers presented in Figure 7 in Table VII
and Table VIII for an average case comparison.
C. Comparing different defenses on VGG-16
In Figure 8, we present the comparison of different de-
fenses on VGG-16.
Figure 8 shows the results from comparing DP-SGD, mix-
up only, MMD loss only, MMD+mix-up defense and Mem-
guard defense together, using AlexNet on CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100. (A similar figure using VGG-16 is in Appendix.)
DP-SGD, MMD+Mixup, and MMD-only have tunable param-
eters and are plotted as curves. The other methods do not have
tunable parameters and show up as a single point in the graph.
In Figure 8(a) and Figure 8(c), we plot testing accuracy against
training accuracy. In Figure 8(b) and Figure 8(d), we plot
accuracy against highest attack advantage. It is still obvious
that our MMD+Mixup defense gives the best trade-off.
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dataset Model learning rate epochs schedule batch size train acc.(%) test acc.(%) MMD loss weight
CIFAR-10 AlexNet 0.01 160 [80,120] 128 99.22 76.26 0.5
CIFAR-10 VGG-16 0.01 160 [80,120] 128 99.31 91.77 1
CIFAR-10 ResNet-20 0.1 160 [80,120] 128 99.39 90.62 0.5
CIFAR-10 ResNet-110 0.1 160 [80,120] 128 99.91 93.28 0.5
CIFAR-10 DenseNet BC(100,12) 0.1 300 [150,225] 64 99.89 95.41 4
CIFAR-100 AlexNet 0.01 160 [80,120] 128 99.22 42.74 4
CIFAR-100 VGG-16 0.01 160 [80,120] 128 99.81 69.91 0.3
CIFAR-100 ResNet-20 0.1 160 [80,120] 128 99.19 67.40 4
CIFAR-100 ResNet-110 0.1 160 [80,120] 128 99.71 71.82 3.5
CIFAR-100 DenseNet BC(100,12) 0.1 300 [150,225] 64 99.79 76.13 2.5
PURCHASE-100 PURCHASE 0.001 100 none 100 99.38 79.58 100
TEXAS-100 TEXAS 0.001 100 none 100 73.32 48.59 20
MNIST MNIST 0.01 100 none 128 99.67 99.03 N/A
TABLE VI: Training recipe and model performance for different models. Learning rate is adjusted to 0.1x when current epoch is
in schedule. Notice that ResNet-18 and DenseNet-121 are designed for ImageNet dataset, therefore these three models start with
a convolutional layer with kernel size 7*7, which leads to slightly worse performance than its sibling CIFAR version: ResNet-20
and DenseNet BC(100,12).
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Fig. 7: Attack advantage of different attacks for different classifiers on different datasets with different level of defenses. DEF1
means no defense, DEF2 means mix-up defense, DEF3 means MMD loss defense and DEF4 means MMD loss &mix-up defense.
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No Defense Mix-up Alone (ablation) MMD Alone (ablation) MMD+Mix-up
Training accuracy 0.990 0.944 0.909 0.883
Testing accuracy 0.775 0.799 0.726 0.775
Generalization gap 0.215 0.145 0.183 0.108
Largest attack advantage 0.158 0.124 0.104 0.088
Baseline attack advantage 0.112 0.074 0.096 0.061
Class-Vector attack advantage 0.138 0.096 0.096 0.052
Global-Loss attack advantage 0.158 0.072 0.104 0.056
Global-Prob. attack advantage 0.147 0.097 0.103 0.062
Global-TopOne attack advantage 0.113 0.082 0.062 0.047
Global-TopThree attack advantage 0.131 0.083 0.065 0.049
Instance-Vector attack advantage 0.111 0.124 0.087 0.088
TABLE VII: (Ablation study) Average Training/Testing accuracy and average attack advantage, CIFAR-10 dataset.
No Defense Mix-up Alone (ablation) MMD Alone (ablation) MMD+Mix-up
Training accuracy 0.985 0.849 0.703 0.592
Testing accuracy 0.366 0.421 0.284 0.365
Generalization gap 0.619 0.429 0.419 0.231
Largest attack advantage 0.318 0.265 0.214 0.133
Baseline attack advantage 0.308 0.221 0.216 0.118
Class-Vector attack advantage 0.299 0.157 0.144 0.088
Global-Loss attack advantage 0.315 0.193 0.214 0.112
Global-Prob. attack advantage 0.318 0.218 0.212 0.117
Global-TopOne attack advantage 0.231 0.173 0.095 0.063
Global-TopThree attack advantage 0.251 0.174 0.103 0.068
Instance-Vector attack advantage 0.211 0.265 0.130 0.133
TABLE VIII: (Ablation study) Average Training/Testing accuracy and average attack advantage, CIFAR-100 dataset.
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Fig. 8: Comparison of different defense techniques on VGG-16, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 dataset.
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